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NOTES
Criminal Trials in Absentia:
A Proposed Reform for Indiana
The right of the accused to be present at trial has been a basic princi-
ple of Anglo-American criminal justice for centuries.1 Although the
right could never be waived under English common law,2 American law
permits waiver of the right under certain circumstances. The United
States Supreme Court has upheld lower court decisions which have held
that the defendant waived the right by refusing to attend the trial,' by
disrupting the trial with misconduct' and by voluntarily failing to return
to a trial in progress.' Although the Supreme Court has declined to
decide whether a defendant who is released on bail and then fails to ap-
pear at the commencement of trial thereby waives the right to be pre-
sent,6 it has stated in dictum that trial courts must conduct a sufficient
inquiry to establish that the defendant is in fact voluntarily absent
before conducting any part of the trial in absentia.7
Indiana appellate courts have recently affirmed three cases in which
the trial courts had proceeded in absentia from the commencement of
trial, after conducting only minimal inquiries into the reasons for the
defendant's absence.' This note will first review the constitutional basis
for the right to be present at trial and the Indiana position on waiver of
that right. It will then argue that the Indiana appellate courts have un-
constitutionally granted discretion to trial judges to try defendants in
absentia without first establishing that the absence at the commence-
ment of the trial is voluntary. Finally, it will conclude that the Indiana
courts should adopt a standard higher than the minimum constitutional
I Cohen, Trial in Absentia Re-Examined, 40 TENN. L. REV. 155, 155 (1973).
See Goldin, Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of the Verdict in Felony Cases, 16
COLUM. L. REV. 18, 20 (1916).
' Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
' Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
5 Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
' The Court declined to decide the constitutionality of a trial held completely in absentia
in Tacon v. Arizona, 107 Ariz. 353, 488 P.2d 973 (1971), cert. granted, 407 U.S. 909 (1972),
cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 351 (1973).
' Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 182 (1975) (dictum).
' Gilbert v. State, - Ind. App. - , 395 N.E.2d 429 (1979); Brown v. State, - Ind.
App. - , 390 N.E.2d 1058 (1979); Taylor v. State, - Ind. App. -, 383 N.E.2d 1068
(1978).
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standard of voluntary absence which would require that even defend-
ants who are voluntarily absent at the commencement of trial could be
tried in absentia only if the state could establish a compelling need for
an immediate trial.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL
Early Constitutional Analysis
Under English common law, the right of a criminal defendant to be
present "at trial was absolute; it was not subject to waiver by the court,
the accused or the accuser.' At the time of the founding of the American
colonies, the common law right was accepted without question into the
American system of criminal justice. °
Although the right was not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution,
the sixth amendment confrontation clause implicitly protected the right
to be present at federal criminal trials." The confrontation clause did
' Goldin, supra note 2, at 20. The right to be present at trial has roots in medieval crimi-
nal proceedings which were private actions instituted by the injured party or his represent-
ative. As criminal proceedings evolved to include a public representative, the defendant
was still required to personally represent his interests since there was no representation
by counsel. The accused's presence was also a jurisdictional prerequisite which no party
could waive. Cohen, supra note 1, at 167-68; Goldin, supra note 2, at 18-20.
A further reason for requiring a defendant's presence was a developing concept of crimi-
nal justice:
[A] pronounced characteristic [of the early common law criminal system] is the
absence of any procedure by which to condemn an accused who fails to appear.
... The reason for this principle must be found, if at all, in a rather sound con-
ception of justice even among the early peoples.... Even the primitive sense
of justice could not tolerate a system by which a person should have a verdict
passed upon him in his absence ....
Id. at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
"* One commentator has noted that "[t]he old English cases on this subject were very
strictly followed in the early jurisprudence of America .... Lehman, A Critical Survey of
Certain Phases of Trial Procedure in Criminal Cases, 63 U. PA. L. REV. 609, 619 (1915).
Supreme Court cases also relied heavily on English cases and commentary to determine the
scope of the right to be present at trial. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370
(1892). Lewis succinctly restated the English concept of the right in its discussion of the
right under American law:
A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is
that, after indictment is found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the
prisoner. While this rule has, at times and in the cases of misdemeanors, been
somewhat relaxed, yet in felonies, it is not in the power of the prisoner, either
by himself or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present during
the trial.
Id. at 372. There is no indication in the case that the Constitution might have changed the
right as it had existed for centuries under English law.
" J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: TRIAL RIGHTS § 5 (1976); Westen,
Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases,
91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 569-71 (1978).
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not protect the right to be present at state criminal trials," so it re-
mained for the Supreme Court to decide whether another provision,
such as the fourteenth amendment due process clause,13 provided pro-
tection in the state courts. Before a body of constitutional authority on
the subject developed, many state legislatures passed statutes codifying
the common law right to be present at criminal trials. 4
The first Supreme Court case to discuss the right to be present at
trial, Hopt v. Utah,5 relied on one such statute to conclude that the
defendant had a right to be present from the beginning of the jury voir
dire."'6 The decision was based on the Court's interpretation of a Utah
statute which required that "the defendant must be personally present
at the trial."'7 Justice Harlan's discussion in the majority opinion of the
Utah statute's requirement of presence concluded with the observation
that if a defendant were deprived of life or liberty without being pres-
ent at all phases of the trial, "such deprivation would be without that
due process of law required by the Constitution."'"
Justice Harlan's brief comment in Hopt did not reveal whether the
fourteenth amendment due process clause was an independent source of
the right to be present at state criminal trials and whether the right
was protected in its common law form. 9 In a subsequent case involving
the right in a state trial, Howard v. Kentucky,"0 the Court elaborated on
the scope of protection guaranteed by the due process clause. The trial
judge in Howard had questioned a juror out of the presence of the
" The sixth amendment confrontation clause was eventually held applicable to state
court proceedings in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
"s The Court did not actually hold that the fourteenth amendment due process clause ap-
plied to the right to be present at trial until Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106
(1934).
" See, e.g., UTAH CRIM. PROc. CODE § 218 (1884):
If the indictment is for a felony, the defendant must be personally present at
the trial; but if for a misdemeanor, the trial may be had in the absence of the
defendant; if, however, his presence is necessary for the purpose of identifica-
tion, the court may, upon application of the prosecuting attorney, by an order
or warrant, require the personal attendance of the defendant at the trial.
110 U.S. 574 (1884).
See id. at 576-77.
'7 Id. at 577-78. For the entire text of the statute, see note 14 supra.
" 110 U.S. at 579.
" The Court again stated in dictum that the due process clause protected the right to be
present at trial in Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442 (1892), and Fielden v. Illinois, 143 U.S.
452 (1892). The defendant in Schwab objected to the practice in Illinois of having the appel-
late court repass the death sentence upon a defendant who was not physically present at
the appeal. The right to be present at the sentencing on the trial level was discussed in
order to define the defendant's right to be present on appeal. The Court concluded that the
right to be present at the sentencing in state courts was protected by a "liberal interpreta-
tion" of the phrase "due process of law." 143 U.S. at 451.
200 U.S. 164 (1906).
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defendant during the voir dire.21 On appeal to the Supreme Court the
defendant argued that his court-enforced absence during the questioning
violated the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments.' The Court rejected
the fifth and sixth amendments as inapplicable to state court proceed-
ings.28 In applying the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
the Court concluded that brief absences which did not injure the defend-
ant's substantial rights and which were permitted under state law were
constitutionally permissible.2 Howard established two themes which
formed the basis for subsequent constitutional analysis of the right in
state courts: first, the due process clause does not forbid state courts
from modifying the common law right if the modification has only a
minor impact on the defendant's substantial rights; and second, the
scope of constitutional protection is determined partially by reference
to prevailing state practice, rather than by reference to common law.
The relevance of prevailing state practice and the Court's willingness
to allow states to modify the common law right were reiterated in Diaz
v. United States,5 which upheld the conviction of a defendant who twice
verbally waived his right to be present during his trial. 8 Even though
such a waiver would have been impermissible under common law,' the
Court approved the practice of most states of upholding voluntary ver-
bal waivers at trials when the defendant was not held in custody and
was not charged with a capital crime.'
M1 Id. at 171-72.
n Id at 172.
Id- at 175.
223 U.S. 442 (1912).
Id at 459. Diaz rose on appeal from the Philippine Islands. The Court noted that the
applicable Philippine constitutional clauses were analogous to the sixth amendment con-
frontation clause of the United States Constitution; consequently, the Court used previous
analysis from confrontation clause cases to determine whether the defendant was per-
mitted to waive the right to be present by authorizing the trial court to proceed in his
absence. Id. at 455.
Se6 notes 2, 9 & accompanying text supra.
2 223 U.S. at 455-56. The Court clearly distinguished between waiver of the right to be
present when the accused is charged with a capital offense and waiver when the accused is
charged with an offense which is not capital:
As the offense in this instance was a felony, we may put out of view the
decisions dealing with this right in cases of misdemeanor. In cases of felony
our courts, with substantial accord, have regarded it as extending to every
stage of the trial, inclusive of the empaneling of the jury and the reception of
the verdict, and as being scarcely less important to the accused than the right
of trial itself. And with like accord they have regarded an accused who is in
custody and who is charged with a capital offense as incapable of waiving the
right; the one, because his presence or absence is not within his own control,
and the other because, in addition to being usually in custody, he is deemed to
suffer the constraint naturally incident to an apprehension of the awful penalty
that would follow conviction. But, where the offense is not capital and the ac-
cused is not in custody, the prevailing rule has been, that if, after the trial has
[Vol. 56:103
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Howard and Diaz did not provide lower courts with a clearly articu-
lated constitutional standard to use in determining what limitations the
due process clause imposed on modification of the right to be present at
state criminal trials.' This problem was remedied twenty-two years
later in Snyder v. Massachusetts,' the first Supreme Court case to
thoroughly analyze the constitutional dimensions of the right to be pres-
ent at state criminal trials. Speaking for the majority, Justice Cardozo
concluded that the sixth amendment privilege to confront one's ac-
cusers, which protected the right to be present in federal courts, was
"reinforced" by the fourteenth amendment." He then went on to reject
any inferences in previous cases that the right to be present at state
criminal trials might be broader than the right to be present as guaran-
teed by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.2 Finally, he
concluded that, under the fourteenth amendment, "the presence of the
defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just
hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only."'
Under the constitutional analysis of Snyder, the due process clause
protects the right of the defendant to be present at trial when the
defendant's presence is required for a fair and just hearing. Thus, the
right to be present at trial is equivocal and may be limited by state
courts, depending on the circumstances of the case and the effect of the
absence on the defendant. In Snyder, the static concept of the common
begun in his presence, he voluntarily absents himself, this does not nullify
what has been done or prevent the completion of the trial, but, on the con-
trary, operates as a waiver of his right to be present and leaves the court free
to proceed with the trial in like manner and with like effect as if he were pres-
ent.
Id. at 455.
As Goldin, supra note 2, at 28, comments, it is not clear how the American courts arrived
at the position that waiver should be permitted if the charged crime was not capital. Appar-
ently, the distinction was not derived from English common law, which would not permit a
judgment to be rendered against an absent defendant even in a civil action. 2 F. POLLACK &
F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 592-93 (2d ed. 1898). The reason for the distinc-
tion in American law is probably the reluctance of the courts to impose the death sentence
on an absent defendant. Nevertheless, courts have not shown the same reluctance to im-
pose a prison sentence and thereby restrict the liberty of an absent defendant.
In subsequent cases, the Court continued to analyze the right to be present at trial by
invoking both common law history and current state modifications of the right. See, e.g.,
Valdez v. United States, 244 U.S. 432 (1917); Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
291 U.S. 97 (1934).
s' Id. at 106.
The Court presumed that previous case analysis on the right to be present at trial car-
ried no constitutional authority:
What was said in Hopt v. Utah ... and Schwab v. Berggren ... on the subject
of the presence of the defendant was dictum, and no more .... We may say
the same of Lewis v. United States ... with the added observation that it
deals with the rule at common law and not with constitutional restraints.
Id at 117 n.*.
" Id. at 107-08.
1980]
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law right was fully rejected as a basis for constitutional analysis. In-
stead, state courts must assess the effect of an absence from trial on the
defendant's right to a fair and just hearing.
Present Constitutional Analysis
After Snyder, the Court did not discuss the issue of constitutional
limitations on the defendant's right to be present at state criminal trials
for thirty-six years. In 1970 the Court held in Illinois v. Allen' that a
defendant who is unruly and disruptive may lose the right to be present
at his own trial. 5 That conclusion emerged by balancing the defendant's
right to be present at trial against society's need for the "proper ad-
ministration of criminal justice."3
The defendant's conduct in Allen made it impossible for the trial
judge to conduct the trial; therefore, after repeated warnings, the judge
removed the defendant until he promised to behave. 7 On appeal, the
Court noted that a defendant such as Allen could indefinitely postpone
his trial by misbehaving, thereby obstructing the orderly progress of
the entire criminal justice system.' Since the trial judge had adequately
protected the defendant's rights,39 the potential for abuse by the defend-
ant was sufficient, in the Court's opinion, to find that the defendant had
"lost" his right to be present at trial.
The holding that the defendant lost his right to be present at trial
represented a significant change in the law of waiver of criminal consti-
tutional rights. For the first time, the Court held that a criminal defend-
ant could constructively waive a constitutional right by his conduct,
rather than by verbally requesting that the right be waived."' Previous
397 U.S. 337 (1970).
Id. at 343, 346.
Sd. at 343.
Id. at 339-41.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 347.
" For a critical discussion of the Court's development of the theory of constructive
waiver in Allen, see Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1970). Tigar describes how Allen and subsequent criminal procedure cases
have moved away without adequate explanation or justification from the Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938), standard of an express waiver by an informed defendant. Tigar, supra,
at 9. The terms "forfeiture of a constitutional right" and "non-consensual waiver" are used
in the article to describe the loss of constitutional rights by misconduct on the part of the
defendant. Id. at 10-11.
Other commentators have also described the results in cases such as Allen as a "forfei-
ture" of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Westen, Away from Waiver A Rationale for the
Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977);
Note, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120 (1971).
Similarly, the advisory committee on criminal rules submitted a proposed amendment of
rule 43 which retitled part (b) "Forfeiture of Right to Be Present." Preliminary Draft of
[Vol. 56:103
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cases dealing with waiver had relied on the standard announced by
Johnson v. Zerbst" that a waiver of a constitutional right was valid only
if it was "an intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege."42 Although the Court cited Johnson to support its
decision,43 no attempt was made to explain how the defendant had intel-
ligently waived a known constitutional right by his inability to control
his conduct during the trial."
The position taken in Allen, that a defendant could forfeit the right to
be present at trial through his conduct, was extended further in Taylor
v. United States.5 The defendant in that case argued that he could not
have waived his constitutional right to be present at trial because he
had not been told that he had such a right or that he would lose it if he
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b),
77 F.R.D. 507, 587 (1978). The committee note clearly describes the reason for the proposed
change from "waiver" to "forfeiture" in language which echoes the reasoning of Tigar:
Subdivision (b) is amended so as to deal with the situations included therein
in terms of forfeiture rather than waiver. Although waiver terminology is
commonly found in the cases, a defendant who absents himself or who engages
in disruptive conduct does not really "agree" to be tried in his absence or "in-
tentionally relinquish" his right to be present. Rather he loses or forfeits his
right to be present by way of a penalty for violating certain obligations or con-
ditions .... This is more than a matter of semantics. In Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337 (1970), holding that a disruptive defendant may be excluded from his
trial, the Court did not conclude that the defendant had waived his right to be
present, but rather than [sic] he "lost his right" by virtue of his behavior "of
such an extreme and aggravated nature as to justify either his removal from
the courtroom or his total physical restraint." The court of appeals had
reached the opposite result by analyzing the case in terms of waiver and con-
cluding that so long as Allen [sic] insisted upon his right to be present, which
he clearly did, he could not be held to have waived it because "the insistence
of a defendant that he exercise this right under unreasonable conditions does
not amount to a waiver." 413 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1969).
I&. at 588-89. For the text of the proposed amendment of FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b), see note 48
infra.
1 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
42 Id. at 464. Although Johnson v. Zerbst dealt with the issue of waiver of the constitu-
tional right to counsel, the holding was not limited to the facts of the case, but spoke broadly of
waivers of "fundamental constitutional rights." Id This case has been cited subsequently in
many other cases which address the waiver of other constitutional criminal rights. See, e.g.,
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1971) (right to speedy trial); Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (right to stand trial on a criminal charge); McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1968) (same); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1967) (right to con-
frontation); Green v. United States, 335 U.S. 184, 191 (1957) (right to be free from double
jeopardy); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (right to trial by
jury and assistance of counsel).
, 397 U.S. at 343.
" In a separate opinion, Justice Douglas discussed the defendant's behavior and con-
cluded that it was probably caused by an apparent mental illness. He described as the real
issue of the case the appropriate constitutional treatment of the mentally ill at criminal
trials, rather than the right to be present at trial. Id. at 351-57 (Douglas, J., separate opin-
ion).
43 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
1980]
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did not return after a recess in the trial.46 The argument was rejected
because the Court found it "incredible" that a defendant who had been
present for part of his trial did not know that he had a constitutional
right to be present and that, once begun, the trial would continue
despite his absence." Under the analysis of Taylor, the defendant's pres-
ence at part of the trial results in a presumption that he knows he has a
" I& at 19.
M' Id. at 20. The Court cited FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 in support of the decision. 414 U.S. at 20.
The pertinent parts of the rule provide:
(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at
the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impanelling of the
jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as
otherwise provided by this rule.
(b) Continued Presence Not Required. The further progress of the trial to
and including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defend-
ant shall be considered to have waived his right to be present whenever a
defendant, initially present,
(1) voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced (whether or
not he had been informed by the court of his obligation to remain during the
trial), or
(2) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will cause him
to be removed from the courtroom, persists in conduct which is such as to
justify his being removed from the courtroom.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a)-(b).
The rule is essentially a codification of existing federal case law. For a discussion of the
passage of the rule and annotations of various cases interpreting the rule, see L. ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 43 (1967 & Supp. 1979). In addition to
the federal rule, most states have similar rules regarding presence at trial. For a compila-
tion of the state laws, see Cohen, supra note 1, at 157-58 n.5. Indiana no longer has such a
rule. See An Act concerning public offenses, ch. 169, §§ 222-223, 1905 Ind. Acts 584 (repealed
1978).
In 1978 the advisory committee on criminal rules submitted a revised version of part (b)
of the rule for comment by members of the bench and bar. If it had been adopted the sec-
tion would have read:
(b) FORFEITURE OF RIGHT TO BE PRESENT. The progress of a trial to
and including the return of a verdict shall not be prevented by defendant's
absence and the defendant shall be considered to have forfeited his right to be
present whenever a defendant,
(1) absents himself from the trial, unless it is thereafter shown that his
absence was for good cause ....
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
43(b), 77 F.R.D. 507, 587 (1978). The suggested changes would have recognized that the
defendant forfeits, rather than waives, the right to be present at trial and would have per-
mitted absentia trials even if the defendant was absent at the commencement of trial. See
note 40 supra.
The proposed revision to the rule was not adopted by the Supreme Court in 1979 when it
adopted others of the proposed amendments and sent them to Congress for consideration.
See Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 47 U.S.L.W. 4488, 4488-91 (April
30, 1979).
Subsequently, when the advisory committee submitted a new preliminary draft of pro-
posed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure it did not include any revi-
sion to rule 43. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 379, 385-416 (1979). Thus, it appears that the present rule
with its "waiver" language and implied prohibition against holding a trial in absentia when
the defendant is absent at the commencement of trial remains intact.
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constitutional right to be present at trial and that he waives the right
by failing to return during the course of the trial.
Taylor adopted the reasoning of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals' opinion in Gureton v. United States,' which held that
a trial may proceed in a defendant's absence if the court establishes that
the absence is voluntary.'9 Under Cureton, an absence is considered
voluntary if the defendant knows that his trial is taking place, that he
has a right and an obligation to be present, and if there is no sound
reason for his absence." While Taylor adopted the Cureton require-
ments, it did not apply them to the facts since the defendant had failed
to allege that his absence was involuntary. 1
The reasoning of Taylor has not been further developed because
subsequent cases have contained only passing references to the right to
be present at trial.62 In Drope v. Missouri,' a defendant who attempted
suicide during his trial objected to the trial court's decision to proceed
in absentia. While Drope did not decide the issue of the right to be
present at trial, it did note in dictum that the trial court had not con-
ducted a sufficient inquiry to decide the issue of waiver.15 That state-
ment implies that a trial court cannot constitutionally decide the issue
of voluntary waiver by merely stating on the record that the defendant
is found to be voluntarily absent. '
Thus, under recent analysis of the right to be present at trial, the
trial judge does have a duty to receive sufficient evidence to make a fac-
tual determination that the defendant's absence is voluntary before he
decides to continue a trial in absentia. While the Court has not yet so
held," a trial judge should have the duty to meet the Cureton require-
ments when the defendant is absent at the commencement of trial.
' 396 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
" Id at 676.
'1 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973).
See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351 (1973).
" 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
Id. at 167.
Id at 182.
A similar procedure was used by the trial court in Drope. See id. at 166.
Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351 (1973), is the only case which has presented the
Supreme Court with a state trial held totally in absentia. The defendant was financially
unable to return to Arizona for his trial on a marijuana charge. He was convicted in absen-
tia and later sentenced to at least five years imprisonment. Because the defendant did not
raise the issue below, the Court refused, despite strenuous objections from the dissenting
Justices, to determine the constitutional limits on a state's authority to try a defendant who
is unable to return for trial. Id. at 352.
The Court dismissed the writ of certiorari on the ground that the "related issue" of
whether a defendant's conduct amounted to a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of the right
to be present at trial was primarily a factual issue which did not justify jurisdiction. Id. The
usage of a knowing and intelligent waiver test is puzzling, if not erroneous, since Taylor,
1980]
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CRIMINAL TRIALS IN ABSENTIA IN INDIANA
As a result of the limited discussion in recent Supreme Court cases of
the right to be present at trial, state and federal courts have adopted a
variety of positions on the issue of whether a judge may proceed in
absentia against a defendant who fails to appear at the commencement
of trial. Several courts do not permit absentia trials when the defendant
has not been present in court." Others permit such trials in a limited
number of cases, primarily those involving multiple defendants in which
the state would be prejudiced by a delay.59 Other jurisdictions, including
Indiana, have given the trial judge almost total discretion to conduct an
absentia trial when the defendant fails to appear. 0
Recently, the Indiana appellate courts have upheld three lower court
decisions to try defendants who were absent at the commencement of
trial. 1 The appellate cases rest solely on the proposition that a defend-
ant should not be permitted to delay the trial by failing to appear at the
time the trial was scheduled.2 Thus, the reasoning echoes the Supreme
Court's public policy determination in Illinois v. Allen and Taylor v.
United States that a defendant may not disrupt or delay a trial by mis-
conduct." However, the Indiana courts have disregarded the Supreme
Court analysis which weighs the defendant's right to be present at trial
under the circumstances of each case."
Indiana Case Law on Absentia Trials
The current emphasis of the Indiana courts on preventing the defend-
ant from interfering with the administration of justice originated in
Broecker v. State, 5 the first Indiana case to consider the effect of a
414 U.S. 17 (1973), speaks only in terms of a voluntary waiver. See notes 45-51 & accompa-
nying text supra.
" See, e.g., People v. Davis, 39 fll. 2d 325, 235 N.E.2d 634 (1968); Commonwealth v.
Felton, 224 Pa. Super. 398, 307 A.2d 51 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974).
" See, e.g., United States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); Campbell v. United
States, 295 A.2d 498 (D.C. 1972).
See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 611 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Pastor,
557 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1088 (1976); State v. Goldsmith, 112 Ariz. 399, 542 P.2d 1098 (1975); Whitley
v. Cioffi, - N.Y.2d - , N.E.2d - , 427 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1980).
'" See note 8 supra.
" Gilbert v. State, __ Ind. App..- .. 395 N.E.2d 429, 432 (1979); Brown v. State,
n__ d. App. -, - 390 N.E.2d 1058, 1061-62 (1979); Taylor v. State, __ Ind. App.
- - 383 N.E.2d 1068, 1070-71 (1978).
See notes 38, 47 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 55-56 & accompanying text supra.
6 168 Ind. App. 231, 342 N.E.2d 886 (1976).
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defendant's absence at the commencement of trial." According to the
trial record, the defendant in Broecker was aware that his trial was tak-
ing place since he was in custody, but he verbally refused to attend the
trial and instructed the judge to proceed without him.6 7 On appeal, the
court held that a defendant may waive his right to be present at trial by
a verbal refusal to attend, provided that the state has no need for his
presence." The appellate court in Broecker relied on the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals' reasoning in United States v. Tortora69 that a defend-
ant has an obligation to appear in court on his trial date and may not
frustrate "the speedy satisfaction of justice""0 by refusing to appear
when the state has a need for his presence.
Broecker was also concerned with the defendant's right to be present
at trial, noting: "In all cases, the trial judge should exercise his sound
discretion so as to protect the defendant's interest in a fair trial."'" The
court stated that the trial judge did an "excellent job" of protecting the
defendant's rights,72 and that, under the circumstances, the defendant's
verbal refusal to attend the trial was a knowing and voluntary waiver. 73
The case was thus decided under the traditional Johnson v. Zerbst stan-
dard for waiver of constitutional rights in criminal cases.7'
Subsequent Indiana cases have broadened the scope of Broecker to in-
clude waivers of the right through misconduct, rather than by a verbal
refusal to attend the trial. The first case to so extend the concept of
waiver was Taylor v. State,75 in which a defendant was two hours late
for one day of the trial.7' The judge waited one hour and then, upon be-
ing informed that the defendant had transportation problems, decided
to resume the trial. The defendant appeared one hour later.77
The constitutional analysis in Taylor v. State was limited to the brief
statement that Snyder v. Massachusetts78 established that the constitu-
tional right to be present at trial could be waived.79 Although the
" Previous cases in Indiana had discussed the right to be present at trial in the context
of defendants who were present for part of the trial. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 249 Ind. 681,
231 N.E.2d 800 (1968); Dean v. State, 234 Ind. 568, 130 N.E.2d 126 (1955); Miles v. State, 222
Ind. 312, 53 N.E.2d 779 (1944); Roberts v. State, 111 Ind. 340, 12 N.E. 500 (1887); State v.
Wilson, 50 Ind. 487 (1875).
168 Ind. App. at 233, 342 N.E.2d at 887.
Id. at 237, 342 N.E.2d at 889.
464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
7' Id. at 1208, quoted in 168 Ind. App. at 235, 342 N.E.2d at 888.T' 168 Ind. App. at 238, 342 N.E.2d at 890.
72 Id
Id. at 237, 342 N.E.2d at 889.
7, See notes 41-43 & accompanying text supra.
71 - Ind. App. - , 383 N.E.2d 1068 (1978).
71 Id. at -, 383 N.E.2d at 1070.
77 Id.
7' 291 U.S. 97 (1934). See generally notes 30-33 & accompanying text supra.
" Ind. App. at - , 383 N.E.2d at 1070.
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Supreme Court case closest to Taylor v. State factually was Taylor v.
United States,8 in which the defendant fled the courtroom during a
break in the trial, the Indiana court failed to cite it or consider its adop-
tion of the Cureton requirement that the trial judge clearly establish
that the defendant's absence was voluntary. 1 Instead, the Indiana court
ruled that while a defendant's mere failure to appear on time would not
constitute waiver, a continued absence would.2 The trial judge's deci-
sion that an unexplained absence permitted the trial to proceed in
absentia was held to be discretionary and reviewable only for abuse.'
Since the trial judge made the decision to proceed in absentia after
waiting only one hour, with no hearing, and despite an explanation for
the absence, the court of appeals' finding of no abuse granted wide dis-
cretion to trial judges. In addition, the court did not give any guidance
to trial judges as to what would constitute an abuse of discretion when
proceeding in absentia.
The scope of discretion granted to trial judges quickly became appar-
ent in Brown v. State.8 The defendant, who was free on bail, failed to
appear at the commencement of his trial. 5 Despite the refusal of both
the prosecutor and the defense counsel to try the case during the
defendant's absence, the trial judge ordered the trial to begin. The
judge proceeded to empanel the jury by himself. Then, in a brief inquiry
about the defendant's absence, the bondsman testified that the defend-
ant's parents had been told of the trial date within the past five days
and the defense attorney testified that he had reminded the defendant
about the trial the night before.8 The judge ruled that his absence was
voluntary.8 7
On appeal, the judge's ruling was affirmed with no constitutional
analysis beyond the broad assertion that "[i]t is established that a
defendant by his conduct may waive both his statutory and constitu-
tional right to be present at his own trial."88 The court stated that it was
8' 414 U.S. 17 (1973). See generally notes 45-50 & accompanying text supra.
81 396 F.2d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
82 = Ind. App. at - , 383 N.E.2d at 1071.
3Id
U__ Ind. App. - , 390 N.E.2d 1058 (1979).
85 1 at 
__ , 390 N.E.2d at 1060.
Id at -' 390 N.E.2d at 1061.
The Court has, and again finds that, the defendant has voluntarily absented
himself and that is based on the testimony of Mr. Maguire [defense counsel]
that he talked to him last night. He agreed to be here and here it is this morn-
ing and he is not here. Now the Appellate Court may hold that that is inade-
quate evidence. They may speculate that maybe a flock of gremlins caught him
and tied him up to an oak tree out here someplace or fence post so that he
couldn't get here.
Id- at - n.2, 390 N.E.2d at 1061 n.2 (quoting trial transcript at 250).
" Id at -, 390 N.E.2d at 1061.
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better to delay the proceedings during the defendant's absence, but fail-
ure to delay was not necessarily error. 9
Taylor and Brown flatly reject the concern for adequate protection of
the defendant's right to be present at trial expressed in Illinois v. Allen
and Drope v. Missouri. Both Supreme Court cases focused on the need
for the trial court to make an informed judgment based on evidence that
the defendant was voluntarily absent before proceeding in absentia.9 By
holding that an unexplained absence is equivalent to a voluntary ab-
sence, Taylor and Brown grant trial judges unconstitutionally broad
discretion to conduct in absentia criminal trials without holding a prior
hearing.
Shortly after Brown, an Indiana appellate court, in Gilbert v. State,92
adopted the Cureton requirements and endorsed the use of a hearing
before trial to decide the waiver issue. 3 Since the defendant was absent
at the commencement of trial, the judge delayed the trial for half an
hour and then questioned the bondsman and the defense attorney con-
cerning the defendant's whereabouts. Both had reminded Gilbert the
night before the trial, but the defense counsel stated that he was not
certain if Gilbert, who was an alcoholic, had been sober during their con-
versation."
Based on this hearing the trial judge began the trial, even though the
defense counsel refused to conduct voir dire, make an opening state-
ment or cross-examine witnesses during his client's absence. When
Gilbert was finally brought into court on a bench warrant, he testified
that he knew it was the day of his trial and he did not want to miss it,
but he was sick in bed from drinking. Although a doctor corroborated
Gilbert's claim that he could not control his drinking, the trial judge
refused to grant the defendant's motion for a mistrial. 5
The facts of Gilbert were analyzed on appeal under the Cureton re-
quirements: that the defendant may not be presumed to have volun-
tarily waived his right to be present unless the evidence establishes
that he knew the trial was taking place, knew that he had a right and an
obligation to be present and had no sound reason for remaining away.
The court concluded that a knowing and voluntary waiver standard was
the appropriate test since the Cureton trial court on remand had used
the standard.97 In addition, the court approved the Gilbert trial court's
" Id. at -, 390 N.E.2d at 1062.
" See notes 39-55 & accompanying text supra.
91Id
- Ind. App. -, 395 N.E.2d 429 (1979).
Id. at -' 395 N.E.2d at 431-32.
" Id- at -, 395 N.E.2d at 430.
Id at -, 395 N.E.2d at 431.
7 1I&
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procedure of first holding an initial hearing when the defendant's ab-
sence is discovered, then issuing a bench warrant and finally, if the
defendant later appears, hearing additional evidence. 8 While the court
adopted the Cureton standard for deciding voluntary waiver of the right
to be present at trial and outlined the procedure for trial courts to
follow before conducting absentia. trials, it ultimately dismissed
Gilbert's claim by stating that it was "not willing to conclude that [he]
was totally incapable of insuring his own presence at trial despite his
alleged condition." '99
Despite the adoption of the Cureton requirements in Indiana, the
defendant's right to be present at trial is still not adequately protected.
After the Gilbert decision, it is possible for trial courts to try in absen-
tia defendants who are too ignorant, ill or misinformed to be aware of
the possible consequences of failing to appear for trial. Thus, in a case
involving an absence at the commencement of trial, Indiana's application
of the Cureton standard to the facts falls short of the constitutional
reasons for the standard.
The Supreme Court's approval of the Cureton requirements implied
that the defendant's right to be present at trial should be weighed
against the public's interest in an effective criminal justice system
under the particular facts of each case.90 The Indiana application of
Cureton does not weigh the competing interests, because the defendant's
waiver of his right to be present at trial is always presumed at the trial
level from an unexplained absence. 10' Since the automatic presumption
does not adequately protect the defendant's right to be present at trial,
the Indiana courts should develop a new approach to trials in absentia.
A Proposed Balancing Test
A new approach to absentia trials in Indiana must reflect the fact that
a defendant's absence at the commencement of trial should be treated
differently from an absence after the trial has begun. When a defendant
has been present during a portion of the trial and then fails to reappear,
the Supreme Court has presumed that the defendant knew that he had a
right to be present and that the trial would be concluded in his ab-
sence. °2 The rationale underlying the presumption is that the defendant
has been present in court and has seen the effort expended by the state
and, therefore, should know that the trial will continue to its conclusion. 103
Id at - , 395 N.E.2d at 432.
10 See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19 n.3 (1973).
... Taylor v. State, - Ind. App. - - 383 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (1978).
1 See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973).
103 Id.
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When a defendant is not present at the commencement of trial, the
reasons for presuming that the defendant knows he has a right to be
present at trial and that the trial will be held in his absence disappear.
It may be factually correct to presume that most defendants who have
been arraigned know they have a right to be present at a future trial."4
But, unlike defendants who have been present for part of the trial, there
is no basis to presume that defendants who have not been present at
trial and have merely posted bail know that their trials may be con-
ducted in absentia if they fail to appear on the date of the trial. It is
possible that the defendant may believe that even a knowing failure to
appear for trial will result only in a loss of bail money and the issuance
of an arrest warrant."5 Some states inform a defendant who posts bail
that failure to appear in court may result in a trial being conducted in
absentia,"' but Indiana law does not require any such warning.
There are a variety of public policy considerations which weigh
strongly against presuming that a defendant who fails to appear at the
commencement of trial is thereby waiving the right to be present. A
defendant who is absent during trial loses many of the procedural safe-
guards which have developed to ensure fair prosecutions. Absent de-
fendants are denied the opportunity to testify on their own behalf and
to aid defense counsel in selecting the jury and cross-examining wit-
nesses."7 In addition, absent defendants may be denied the assistance of
counsel if the defense attorney refuses to participate in the trial during
his client's absence. 0 8
Even if the defendant's rights are adequately protected, the defend-
ant, who has not witnessed the trial, is likely to conclude that his rights
were violated and that he was unfairly convicted."9 Such a perception of
unfairness may impede rehabilitation by convincing the defendant that
the system is unfairly punishing him."' Since one of the goals of punish-
'"4 See United States v. MacPherson, 421 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (characterizing
defendant's assertion that he was unaware of his right to he present as "dubious").
15 "[T]he question still remains whether the appellant was apprised that besides bail
jumping penalties an additional consequence would be the continuation of trial in his
absence, which was tantamount to a guilty plea." Id at 1130.
108 See, e.g., State v. Thornburg, 111 Ariz. 254, 255, 527 P.2d 762, 763 (1974) (form stating
in bold type that the defendant had a right to be present at trial, but if he failed to appear
the proceedings would begin without him).
'" For an extensive discussion of the benefits and detriments to a defendant which arise
from being physically present in court, see Cohen, supra note 1, at 176-89.
16 It appears that defense counsel frequently refuse to participate if the proceedings con-
tinue while the defendant is absent. See, e.g., Gilbert v. State, - Ind. App. -, -,
395 N.E.2d 429, 430 (1979); Brown v. State, - Ind. App. -, , 390 N.E.2d 1058,
1060 (1979). The cases dealing with absentia trials do not discuss what action defense coun-
sel should take when the client fails to appear. Similarly, the cases do not discuss whether
defense counsel has any responsibility to make sure that the defendant is aware of the trial
date and of the fact that the trial may be held in absentia if the defendant fails to appear.
'0 Cohen, supra note 1, at 178.HId at 178-79.
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ing convicted defendants is rehabilitation,"' the indiscriminate use of
absentia proceedings should be restricted; to do otherwise would en-
courage defendants' perceptions that the system is unfair.
The defendant's belief that he was unfairly convicted is particularly
justified if the jury concludes that the defendant was absent because of
guilt and fear of conviction. To prevent such a conclusion, some jurisdic-
tions require that the judge admonish the jury not to consider the
defendant's absence as evidence of guilt."2 Indiana does not require such
an instruction; in fact, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Skinner v. State,"'
concluded that a jury could consider a defendant's failure to appear at
the trial as evidence to "aid ... in determining ... guilt or innocence."",
The jury instruction under review was upheld under the rationale that
it did not actually instruct the jury that they could draw an inference of
guilt from the absence.' The court did not explain why his absence
from trial, which is not relevant to any element of the charged crime,
may be considered by the jury at all.
A defendant who is convicted in absentia, therefore, may receive less
effective legal representation and may be prejudiced by the jury's infer-
ence of guilt from his absence. The Supreme Court has ruled that it is
constitutionally permissible for a defendant to suffer the procedural
losses arising from absence if he has been present for part of the trial."'
This loss is permissible because the public's right to an efficient crimi-
nal justice system is considered to outweigh the defendant's right to be
present at trial once the trial has begun. 7 When the trial has not yet
begun, however, the public's interest in the trial does not weigh as
heavily since the jury has not been selected, witnesses have not testi-
fied and the judge and prosecutors have not wasted time at trial. In fact,
if a trial is held completely in absentia and it is later discovered that the
defendant was totally unable to be present, wasted time and expense
are a certainty since a trial de novo must then be held."8 The Indiana
'" W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 5(c) (1972).
I See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Turino, 458 F.2d 1345, 1346 (9th Cir. 1972) (judge
admonished jury after finding defendant voluntarily absent); People v. Montgomery, 64
Mich. App. 101, 102, 235 N.W.2d 75, 76 (1975) (judge instructed jury to draw no inference
from defendant's absence).
-- Ind. - , 383 N.E.2d 307 (1978).
". Id at -, 383 N.E.2d at 309 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at ., 383 N.E.2d at 308 (majority opinion). The most recent Indiana case to deal
with the issue of jury instructions in absentia trials is McHenry v. State, Ind. App.
-, 401 N.E.2d 745 (1980). The defendant there claimed that the trial judge's admonish-
ment to the jury not to infer anything from the defendant's absence was prejudicial. The
court of appeals did not rule on the merits of the defendant's claim since he had not ob-jected to the preliminary admonishment at trial. Id at -, 401 N.E.2d at 748.
See notes 45-51 & accompanying text supra.
"v See id.
"' See Gilbert v. State, - Ind. App .... 395 N.E.2d 429, 431 (1979).
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courts have not yet considered the potential added time and expense in
approving broad discretion to trial judges to hold trials completely in
absentia.
In other jurisdictions, courts have found that the state's interest in
proceeding with a trial which has not yet begun is insufficient to permit
a trial in absentia unless the state can prove the need for an immediate
trial."9 One particularly well-reasoned example is the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in United States v. Tortora.2° Although the
court of appeals held that the defendant had waived his right to be pres-
ent at trial by failing to appear at the commencement of trial,1 ' the
holding was limited to the extraordinary circumstances involved in the
case, which included a multi-defendant criminal conspiracy charge and
threats of physical harm to several potential witnesses."2 The opinion
instructed trial judges to conduct trials in absentia "only when the public
interest clearly outweighs that of the voluntarily absent defendant."'23
In Tortora, the court described the variety of circumstances which
the trial court should consider after concluding that the defendant was
voluntarily absent under the Cureton standard. 24 First, the judge
should weigh the likelihood that the trial could soon proceed with the
defendant present. Next, the court must consider the difficulties of re-
scheduling the trial, particularly when there are multiple defendants.
Finally, in a multiple defendant case, the judge should weigh the burden
on the state of conducting more than one trial, evaluating the possibility
of overlapping evidence and extended periods of jeopardy for witnesses
who must testify. Tortora concluded that it was difficult "to conceive of
any case where the exercise of this discretion [to conduct trials com-
pletely in absentia] would be appropriate other than a multiple-defend-
ant case."'"
The Tortora test attempts to equitably balance the defendant's right
to be present at trial against the state's interest in criminal prosecution.
The test requires trial judges to make a two-pronged analysis before ex-
ercising discretion to conduct trials completely in absentia. First, the
court must determine that the evidence before it establishes that the
defendant is voluntarily absent under the requirements of Cureton.
Then, the court must determine that the government's interest in im-
mediately trying the defendant outweighs the defendant's right to be
,' See text accompanying note 58 supra.
' 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
1' Id. at 1208-09.
Id. at 1210.
rn Id.
Id. at 1209.
u Id. at 1210 n.7.
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present at trial.'26 Under the Tortora, test very few defendants absent
at the commencement of trial could be tried in absentia.'27
Although the Tortora test is not constitutionally mandated, it is com-
mensurate with the Supreme Court's requirement of a Cureton-like
determination of voluntary absence which considers the circumstances
of the defendant's absence. In addition, it properly balances the inter-
ests of the defendant and the state. It would thus be an improvement
over the current Indiana position which totally fails to weigh the de-
fendant's interest in being present at trial against the state's interest in
fulfilling its prosecutorial duties. Finally, the Tortora test limits judicial
discretion by describing the circumstances the court should weigh
before deciding to try a defendant who is absent at the commencement
of trial.
CONCLUSION
The Indiana courts should permit the trial of defendants who are ab-
sent at the commencement of trial only when the trial court concludes,
based on clear evidence, that the defendant is voluntarily absent under
the Cureton requirements and that the public's interest in immediately
trying the defendant outweighs the defendant's interest in being pres-
ent at trial. The current Indiana position, which permits trials to begin
when the defendant is absent without explanation for even a brief
period at the commencement of trial, inequitably deprives all absent
defendants of the benefits of being present during trial, regardless of
the reason for the absence. That broad grant of discretion to trial
judges is unconstitutional because it allows them to completely ignore
the defendant's right to be present at trial.
The right to be present at trial is a time-honored part of our system of
criminal justice. It is a constitutionally protected right of criminal de-
fendants which should not be denied because of an unexplained failure
to appear in court. It is time for the Indiana courts to ensure that de-
fendants meet justice in person, rather than in absentia.
MYRA L. WILLIS
12 See id at 1210.
' This is because absentia trials could only be held when there were multiple defendants
and difficulties in rescheduling the trial or protecting witnesses from harrassment. See id.
at 1210 & n.7.
[Vol. 56:103
